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NOTES
BEYOND MERGENS: BALANCING A STUDENT'S FREE
SPEECH RIGHT AGAINST THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE IN PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL EQUAL ACCESS
CASES
On June 4, 1990, the United States Supreme Court decided
Board of Education v. Mergens,' a case that forced the Court to
evaluate the constitutionality of the Equal Access Act 2 and ad-
dress the equal access dilemma in the public high school context
for the first time The Court upheld the Equal Access Act4 but
could not agree on why the Act is constitutional.5 The Justices'
theoretical dissonance is understandable. Public high school equal
access disputes pose an especially divisive constitutional question
because they reveal a tension between two central first amend-
ment values: the right of free speech and the establishment
clause's separation of church and state.6
The facts of Mergens provide a timely illustration of the cir-
cumstances in which equal access claims arise. In Mergens, two
public high school students sought to form a Christian Bible Club
that would meet during the school's extracurricular club time.7
1. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 4071-4074 (1988).
3. In Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 475 U.S. 534 (1986), the Court
decided an equal access case on the issue of standing without reaching the constitutional
questions.
4. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2373, 2378.
5. The Justices aligned behind five different opinions. Justice O'Connor worded the
Court's opinion and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Blackmun, Scalia, and
Kennedy joined. Id. at 2362-70. The final section of O'Connor's opinion garnered the
support of only Rehnquist, White, and Blackmun. Id. at 2370-73 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
Scalia joined Kennedy's concurrence. Id. at 2376-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice
Marshall wrote a concurrence which Justice Brennan joined. Id. at 2378-83 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). Finally, Justice Stevens offered a lone dissent. Id. at 2383-93 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
6. Strossen, A Constitutional Analysis of the Equal Access Act's Standards Goveining
Public School Student Religious Meetings, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 117, 123 (1987).
7. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2362. This Note addresses only the equal access situation in
which student-initiated religious groups seek access to school facilities. Equal access
disputes, however, cover a much broader range. See generally Gregoire v. Centennial
School Dist., 907 F.2d 1366 (3d Cir.) (unconstitutional for school district to bar Christian
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School policy required clubs to meet after school hours and to
have faculty sponsors. 8 The high school allowed students to
choose voluntarily from thirty different afterschool groups, in-
cluding a chess club, a scuba-diving club, and various community
service groups.9 The high school administrators denied access to
the student-initiated Bible Club because of establishment clause
concerns. 10
Although equal access cases place two compelling constitutional
values in contest, some school administrators in similar situations
have shown extreme favoritism for the establishment clause
interest in an effort to avoid lawsuits." For example, an admin-
istrator in Orlando, Florida, prevented an eight-year-old from
distributing Christmas cards to her classmates; a Colorado school
district forbade two or more students from sitting together if
they were having a religious discussion; another school district
prohibited students from praying in their car while in a school
evangelical youth organization from using school auditorium when facility was rented
regularly to other community groups), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3276 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1990);
Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 852 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1988)
(church granted preliminary injunction after board of education refused to renew permit
allowing church to use public school building during nonschool hours); Rivera v. East
Otero School Dist. R-1, 721 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Colo. 1989) (official policy banning student
dispersion of material that proselytizes particular religious or political belief was uncon-
stitutional); Bacon v. Bradley-Bourbonnais High School Dist. No. 307, 707 F. Supp. 1005
(C.D. IMl. 1989) (school district policy barring plaintiff from distributing Bibles on sidewalk
in front of high school violated first amendment rights); Grace Bible Fellowship, Inc. v.
Maine School Admin. Dist. No. 5, No. 89-0275-B, slip op. (D. Me. Dec. 11, 1989) (denied
request for restraining order that would have required school to allow religious group to
use the cafeteria for a religious celebration open to the public); Thompson v. Waynesboro
Area School Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (school district policy restricting
students' distribution of religious literature to area outside school violated students'
freedom of speech).
This Note singles out the equal access claims of student-initiated religious clubs because
such cases place the free speech and establishment clause interests in direct confrontation.
The discussion of the public forum doctrine and the "impressionability rationale" in the
final section of the Note, however, applies fully to other equal access scenarios. The
proposed test will apply any time a limited public forum is found or the Court otherwise
strictly scrutinizes a content-based speech restriction.
8. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2362-63.
9. Id. at 2362. The thirty clubs included Band, Chess Club, Cheerleaders, Choir, Class
Officers, Distributive Education, Speech & Debate, Drill Squad & Squires, Future Business
Leaders of America, Future Medical Assistants, Interact, International Club, Latin Club,
Math Club, Student Publications, Student Forum, Dramatics, Creative Writing Club,
Photography Club, Orchestra, Outdoor Education, Swimming Timing Team, Student
Advisory Board, Intramurals, Competitive Athletics, Zonta Club, Subsurfers, Welcome to
Westside Club, Wrestling Auxiliary, and National Honor Society. Id. at 2373-76.
10. Id. at 2362-63.
11. Crewdson, The Equal Access Act of 1984: Congressional and the Free Speech Limits
of the Establishment Clause in Public High Schools, 16 J. L. & EDUC. 167, 167-68 (1987).
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parking lot; and an El Paso school district instructed a student
to desist from praying publicly and telling other students about
her beliefs. 12
In response to such excessive applications of the establishment
clause, Congress passed the Equal Access Act13 in 1984 to "clarify
and confirm the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech,
freedom of association, and free exercise of religion which accrue
to public school students who desire voluntarily to exercise those
rights during extracurricular periods of the school day when the
school permits extracurricular activities."' 4 Mergens forced the
Court to determine the Equal Access Act's constitutionality and
provided an opportunity for the Court to engage in the difficult
task of balancing fundamental constitutional interests. The Court
made little of the opportunity.'5
This Note examines the tension between the establishment
clause and the student's right of free speech in the equal access
context. First, the Note discusses the constitutional doctrines
that evolved from the Court's past establishment clause and free
speech cases involving public schools. Second, the Note considers
the quintessential equal access case, Widmar v. Vincent;'6 the
Equal Access Act; Mergens; and the different balancing ap-
proaches adopted by the courts of appeals and some Justices in
Mergens. Third, the Note probes the inadequacies of the "im-
pressionability rationale"' 7 and urges its abandonment. Finally,
the Note proposes an evidentiary test which provides a doctri-
nally sensitive method for balancing free speech rights against
the establishment clause by blending the various standards that
the Court used traditionally to measure those interests.
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES AT ISSUE IN EQUAL ACCESS CASES
The Establishment Clause and Public High Schools
Pursuant to the first amendment, the Supreme Court has
restricted repeatedly any attempt to use public high schools to
12. Id.
13. 20 U.S.C. SS 4071-4074 (1988). See infra notes 108-21 and accompanying text.
14. S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMiN. NEws 2306, 2349.
15. See infra notes 201-08 and accompanying text.
16. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
17. See infra note 214 and accompanying text for a description of the impressionability
rationale.
1990]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
inculcate religious beliefs.18 Justice Frankfurter articulated the
establishment clause's import in McCollum v. Board of Education 9 :
Separation means separation, not something less. Jefferson's
metaphor in describing the relation between Church and State
speaks of a "wall of separation," not of a fine line easily
overstepped. The public school is at once the symbol of our
democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our
common destiny. In no activity of the State is it more vital to
keep out divisive forces than in its schools, to avoid confusing,
not to say fusing, what the Constitution sought to keep strictly
apart.20
The test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman2' determines establish-
ment clause violations. The Lemon test requires that the govern-
ment policy in question have a secular purpose, that its "principle
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion," and that the policy must not foster excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion.22
In McCollum, the Court's only establishment clause case ad-
dressing a school access policy, the Court struck down a program
through which religious teachers provided religious instruction
in public school classrooms during the school day to students
who voluntarily chose to attend.23 As in other high school estab-
lishment clause cases, the Court in McCollum expressed a fear
that high school students' impressionability would cause them to
perceive government support for religion when religious expres-
sion occurred within school walls. 24
18. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (struck down statute requiring the
teaching of creationism); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (struck down moment of
silence); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (struck down the posting of the
Ten Commandments on classroom wall); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(struck down classroom Bible readings); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (struck down
reading of state-composed prayer); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (struck
down release time for voluntary religious instruction).
19. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
20. Id. at 231.
21. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
22. Id. Professor Strossen argues that establishment concerns focus on the public
school's actions while performing its inculcative role. Strossen, supra note 6, at 147. She
suggests the school's role when addressing equal-access-type decisions or policy is non-
inculcative. Id.
23. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 209-12, 227-31 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311-15 (1952), however, the Court upheld a program that permitted
students to leave school during the school day to attend religious instruction at another
location. Importantly, neither McCollum nor Zorach involved student-initiated activities.
24. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 227-28 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter
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The Right to Free Speech in Public High Schools
In limited circumstances, the government may constitutionally
restrict a citizen's right to free expression when an important
public interest outweighs that right.25 This section examines two
independent strands of free speech jurisprudence which apply to
public high school equal access disputes: the Court's decisions
regarding non-establishment clause related student speech 26 and
the public forum doctrine.2
Non-establishment Clause Restrictions on Student Speech
Throughout this century, the role of a high school's educational
mission as a limitation on student speech grew in importance as
America placed increased emphasis on public education's incul-
cative role.a Not only must public high schools instruct students
in academic subjects, but they also must inculcate society's values
and teach good citizenship.2
In pursuing the secondary part of their mission, public high
schools have an interest in maintaining order and control.30 This
interest is inconsistent with a student's right to complete freedom
of expression.31 As Professor Levin notes:
The dilemma is clear: Education necessarily involves the proc-
ess of selection, but it also requires some degree of order
within the institution to carry out the educational mission. On
the other hand, if the educational institution is wholly unde-
argued that even the voluntary nature of student attendance at the religious classes did
not "eliminate the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to con-
science . . . . The law of imitation operates, and non-conformity is not an outstanding
characteristic of children." Id. at 227 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
25. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel or defamation of
limited public figures); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscene material); Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (advocacy of illegal action); New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel or defamation of public officials); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words).
26. See infra notes 28-56 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 57-84 and accompanying text.
28. See Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and
Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1647-49 (1986).
29. See, e.g., Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (plurality opinion) (community interest in developing respect for
authority and traditional values); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) (preparation
for citizenship in a democracy).
30. Levin, supra note 28, at 1649.
31. Id. at 1662.
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mocratic, students are likely to get mixed signals with regard
to the democratic values needed to function as citizens in our
society: The way in which school administrators operate schools
may have a more powerful influence on students than the
lessons in their civics textbooks. 32
The Supreme Court sought to balance the public educators'
interest in order against the students' free speech right in three
primary cases: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District3; Bethel School District v. Fraser3; and Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier.35
In Tinker, the Court determined that a school regulation pro-
hibiting several students from wearing black armbands to protest
the Vietnam War while on school premises violated their free
speech rights.36 The Court reasoned that an "undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome
the right to freedom of expression.."37 Before a school could limit
expression, the Court required the school to prove that "engaging
in the forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school.' "8
In Bethel, the Court ruled that a school district acted within
its authority when it suspended a student for making an "offen-
sively lewd and indecent speech" at a school assembly.39 The
majority stated, "The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular
and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be bal-
anced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching
students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior. '40 In
essence, Bethel lowered Tinker's requirement of a specific finding
of harm,41 thus weakening students' free speech rights.42
Finally, in Hazelwood, the Court upheld a school administrator's
decision to remove two pages from the student newspaper be-
cause an included article on divorce and pregnancy was "inap-
32. Id. at 1649.
33. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
34. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
35. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
36. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-14.
37. Id. at 508.
38. Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
39. Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
40. Id. at 681.
41. Strossen, supra note 6, at 131-32. But see infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
42. Strossen, supra note 6, at 132.
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propriate" and risked identifying pregnant students.4 The opinion
stated, "[E]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by ex-
ercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns. '44 The Court in Hazelwood relied on the public forum
doctrine 4 5 ruling that the school newspaper was not a public
forum.46 Rather, the school officials "'reserve[d] the forum for its
intended purpos[e].' "47 This apparent application of the nonpublic
forum to restrict high school speech rights is disturbing because
it invites censorship by school officials.
48
Bethel and Hazelwood appear to weaken Tinker's "substantial
disruption or material interference standard. '49 Specifically, Ha-
zelwood requires only that the school's speech restrictions "rea-
sonably relate[ ] to legitimate pedagogical concerns." 5 Equal access
cases, however, are similar to the Tinker facts and distinguishable
from those encountered in Bethel and Hazelwood.51
Unlike the equal access disputes that this Note contemplates,
52
Hazelwood and Bethel involved student speech inconsistent with
the school's role of inculcating social values.0 In other words,
the school officials in Hazelwood and Bethel objected legitimately
to the content of the speech. In equal access scenarios, however,
the establishment clause precludes school officials from seeking
to influence what religious views their students may hold or
express. Equal access cases are similar to Tinker in this respect.
Like Tinker's symbolic speech,M access requests by student relig-
43. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262-63 (1988).
44. Id. at 273.
45. See infra notes 57-84 and accompanying text.
46. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267-70.
47. Id. at 270 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
46 (1983)).
48. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
49. Strossen, supra note 6, at 131-32.
50. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
51. Professor Rodney A. Smolla, Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law and Director of
the Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the College of William and Mary, suggested the
distinctions used to support this section of analysis in an advisory conversation during
the Note-writing process.
52. Student-initiated religious groups seeking access to public high school facilities. See
supra note 7.
53. In Bethel, a student government campaign speech used "an elaborate, graphic, and
explicit sexual metaphor" in front of most of the student body. Bethel School Dist. v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986). Hazelwood involved the schoolwide publication of an
article discussing and identifying pregnant students. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262-63.
54. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
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ious clubs involve situations in which the school may hold no
position regarding the content of the students' expression. Fur-
thermore, the students' speech is "passive. 55 Noncurricular re-
ligious clubs do not actively address a schoolwide audience as
did the communicators in Hazelwood and Bethel.
If the students do speak to a schoolwide audience and the
expressed viewpoints actively contradict values the school is
rightfully inculcating, these circumstances warrant Hazelwood's
"reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns" test. In
the equal access situation, however, the speech is passive; the
student group is not a schoolwide audience; and the school may
not claim any interest in affirming or denying the speech content
without violating the establishment clause. In equal access cases,
Tinker's requirement of a concrete injury is most appropriate.
The Public Foram Doctrine
The public forum doctrine concerns mostly the location, rather
than the content, of the speech in question.57 Under the doctrine's
original premise, when the government opens up a certain fo-
rum - usually a physical location - to free speech, the government
cannot limit speech on the basis of content unless a compelling
state interest exists and the government's policy is the least
restrictive means.s
The Supreme Court has delineated four types of forums: tra-
ditional public forums, designated public forums, nonpublic fo-
rums, and limited public forums. 9 Traditional public forums have
a long tradition of public assembly and debate.60 Commonly, such
forums exist in town squares, street corners, or public parks that
"have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions."61 In a traditional public forum, courts strictly scruti-
nize any content-based exclusions. 2
A designated public forum contemplates
55. Id. at 508.
56. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
57. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
58. Id. at 45.
59. See id. at 54-55.
60. Hague v. CI0, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
61. Id.
62. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (relying on Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980)).
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public property which the State has opened for use by the
public as a place for expressive activity. . . .Although a State
is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of [this
forumI as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards
as apply in a traditional public forum.63
In contrast, in a nonpublic forum, "the State may reserve .the
forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as
long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort
to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view." 64 The State may distinguish between speakers
on the basis of "subject matter and speaker identity."65 Impor-
tantly, "[t]he touchstone for evaluating these distinctions is
whether they are reasonable in light of the purpose which the
forum at issue serves. 66
The existence of a fourth forum-the limited public forum-is
arguably unsettled. Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
Educators' Association67 suggests that a limited public forum
"may be created for a limited purpose such as use by certain
groups.66 The opinion referenced Widmar v. Vincent,69 an impor-
tant equal access case, to illustrate a limited public forum.7" The
Court's 1985 decision in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
Education Fund,7 1 however, "effectively eliminated the limited
public forum as an analytically separate category."72
63. Id. at 45-46.
64. Id. at 46 (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns,
453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)).
65. Id. at 49.
66. Id. "The Government's decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum need only
be reasonable, it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation."
United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3122 (1990) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985)).
Commentators have criticized the nonpublic forum category because it permits ad hoc
decisions that easily lead to censorship. See, e.g., Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature
of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA.
L. REV. 1219 (1984); see infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. In the Court's most
recent public forum case, however, the Court reaffirmed the nonpublic forum's existence.
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121-22.
67. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
68. Id. at 46 n.7.
69. 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (prohibiting a state university's content-based exclusion of
religious speech from a forum generally open to students).
70. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7.
71. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
72. Strossen, supra note 6, at 127. United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990),
the Court's most recent public forum case, also lends support to this proposition. The
Court stated that Perry "announced a tripartite framework" for resolving public forum
cases: the traditional public forum; the designated public forum; and the nonpublic forum.
Id. at 3119-20. Kokinda never mentioned the limited public forum.
1990]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
If the nonpublic forum subsumes the limited public forum, high
school administrators will be free to limit access on the basis of
''subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions
drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum."73 Unlike limited public forum review, this reasonableness
standard never requires the court to strictly scrutinize content-
based discrimination. Although Cornelius recognized that "the
government violates the First Amendment when it denies access
to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses,' 7 4
without strict scrutiny the courts rarely will be able to distinguish
meaningfully content-based discrimination from viewpoint-based
discrimination. Such a situation invites public school administra-
tors to overextend the nonpublic forum doctrine with impunity7 5
and thus precludes any religious group speech rights7 6 other than
those guaranteed by the Equal Access Act.77
The Supreme Court should avoid potential abuses of the non-
public forum by rejecting the nonpublic forum in high school
equal access cases and adopting Widmar's limited public forum.
Widmar required courts to strictly scrutinize content-based de-
nials of access to limited public forums.7 8 This approach is doc-
trinally consistent with current law. First, the various opinions
in Board of Education v. Mergens7 9 use Widmar as their analytical
starting point." In other words, the opinions in the only Supreme
Court decision addressing high school equal access relied heavily
on Widmar and the implications of Widmar's limited public forum
to high school access disputes.81 Second, the only free speech
73. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)).
74. Id.
75. Strossen, supra note 6, at 128.
76. Most equal access cases involve the speech rights of student groups. Although
courts have recognized that speech rights do not disappear when individuals act as a
group, one commentator suggested that group speech rights are inherently incompatible
with the secondary school environment. Teitel, Equal Access Policies, 12 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 529, 580-81 (1985).
77. 20 U.S.C. SS 4071-4074 (1988).
78. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981); see infra notes 85-107 and accom-
panying text for a complete discussion of Widnar.
79. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
80. See id. at 2364; id. at 2370-71 (O'Connor, J., plurality); id. at 2376 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); id. at 2378 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 2383-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 2371 (O'Connor, J., plurality) ("We think the logic of Widmar applies with
equal force to the Equal Access Act."); id. at 2376-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (Widmar
alone should not determine the Equal Access Act's constitutionality); id. at 2378-82
(Marshall, J., concurring) (Widmar's effect on high school access cases depends, in part,
on factual comparisons between the forum in dispute and the forum at issue in Widmar);
id. at 2383-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (because the Equal Access Act adopts Widmar
entirely, the Court must rely exclusively on Widmar to interpret congressional intent).
[Vol. 32:127
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decision finding that a nonpublic forum existed at a public high
school, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,8 2 is distinguishable
from the equal access situation. Unlike Hazelwood, the student
speech that occurs when student groups seek access to school
facilities is passivem and, at least in the context of religious
student groups, the school has no interest in either hindering or
supporting the students' viewpoint.84
BALANCING THE COMPETING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
Widmar v. Vincent
Although Board of Education v. Mergens85 was the Supreme
Court's first equal access ruling addressing public high schools,16
the Court in Mergens considered the constitutionality of only the
Equal Access Act. 7 In 1981, however, the Court directly ad-
dressed the tension between free speech and the establishment
clause in the context of public universities in Widmar v. Vincent.s
The University of Missouri at Kansas City had opened its facil-
ities to student-initiated, voluntary, nonreligious student groups.89
An evangelical Christian student group used the school facilities
to pray and worship for four years before the University changed
its policy to exclude facility use for the purposes of worship and
religious teaching.90 The student group sued, and the Supreme
Court required the University to grant the Christian group use
of the facilities.91
Writing for the Court, Justice Powell found that the University
created a limited public forum by making its facilities generally
accessible to student groups.9 2 Because the revised regulations 93
prohibiting use for religious purposes discriminated between
groups on the basis of speech content, the University needed to
82. 484 U.S. 260, 267-70 (1988).
83. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
85. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
86. The Court previously faced, but chose not to address, the merits of a high school
equal access case. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984),
vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
87. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2370, 2373.
88. 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981).
89. Id. at 265.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 277.
92. Id. at 267, 272.
93. Id. at 265 n.3.
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show that a compelling state interest existed and that the Uni-
versity narrowly drew the regulations to pursue the compelling
interest.9 4 The Court acknowledged that an establishment clause
violation constitutes a compelling state interest 95 but found that
no violation occurred.96
Applying the Lemon test,97 Justice Powell reasoned that only
one prong of the three-pronged test was in dispute98: Would
permitting religious groups' entry into the limited public forum
have the primary effect of advancing religion?99 Because more
than 100 student groups could access the facilities, Powell rea-
soned that permitting the Christian group's access posed no
danger of a reasonable perception that the state endorsed a
particular religious expression. 00 Thus, "any religious benefits of
an open forum at UMKC would be 'incidental.' ",101
In supporting his argument, Powell suggested implicitly that
the danger of state imprimatur which flows from granting relig-
ious groups access to limited public forums is greater for younger
students: "University students are, of course, young adults. They
are less impressionable than younger students and should be
able to appreciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality
toward 'religion.'10 2 Although the statement is nebulously broad,
the Court's observation suggested that Widmar's resolution of
the Lemon test's third prong is not blindly transferable to the
high school situation.10 3
Finally, the presumptions inherent in the Widmar opinion are
instructive. The Court assumed that "the interest of the Univer-
sity in complying with its constitutional obligations may be char-
acterized as compelling."' 1 4 Although the Court found no
establishment clause violation, its assumption holds serious ana-
lytical consequences. If proof of an establishment clause violation
94. Id. at 269-70.
95. Id. at 271.
96. Id. at 270-75.
97. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
98. "In this case two prongs of the test are clearly met. Both the District Court and
the Court of Appeals held that an open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against
religious speech, would have a secular purpose and would avoid entanglement with
religion." Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-72 (footnotes omitted).
99. Id. at 272.
100. Id. at 273-74, 274 n.14.
101. Id. at 274.
102. Id. at 274 n.14.
103. In addition, Powell's comment in footnote 14 does not, logically speaking, suggest
an opposite conclusion in high school cases. Strossen, supra note 6, at 134.
104. Widnar, 454 U.S. at 271.
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automatically meets the "compelling state interest" requirement
under free speech analysis, the Court implicitly places the estab-
lishment clause ahead of free speech concerns. In the equal access
context, this paradigm permits public high school administrators
to veto the access requests of religious student groups any time
they see an establishment clause violation.05
As Powell recognized, the school must use the least restrictive
means available to achieve a compelling state interest.' 6 Thus, a
school administrator must narrowly draw a policy to avoid the
appearance of state endorsement of religion. In some equal access
cases, however, courts overlooked this requirement.' °7 As a result,
the establishment clause preempted the free speech doctrines. In
this manner, those courts undermined the important task of
balancing students' free speech rights against the establishment
clause.
The Special Case of Noncurricular Activity Periods
The Equal Access Act
The Equal Access Act of 1984108 represented an unusually
bipartisan effort'0 9 to "clarify and confirm the First Amendment
rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association, and free
exercise of religion which accrue to public school students who
desire voluntarily to exercise those rights during extracurricular
periods of the school day when the school permits extracurricular
105. One court did not construe this aspect of the Widmar analysis broadly. The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized the problem in the Widrar statement and
interpreted the statement narrowly:
Although the Supreme Court has noted ... that the Establishment Clause
"may" provide a compelling state interest which would override free speech
rights, [Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271], it clearly did not state that such super-
session would be automatic whenever the two clauses conflict. Such a holding
would place the Establishment Clause in a position of permanent supremacy
over the free speech clause, a constitutional hierarchy which we do not think
the Framers intended.
Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 558 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on
other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
106. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270.
107. See, e.g., Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989);
Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 852 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1988);
Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on other
grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
108. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988).
109. Crewdson, supra note 11, at 172.
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activities." 110 Essentially, the Act sought to extend statutorily
the Widmar v. Vincent"' holding to public high school equal
access disputes."12
The Act defines a noncurricular period designated for student
groups and activities as a "limited open forum."" 3 If such a forum
exists in a public secondary school, the Act prohibits any school
decision or policy that "[denies] equal access or a fair opportunity
to, or discriminate[s] against, any students who wish to conduct
a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the
religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech
at such meetings."" 4
The definitions of "noninstructional time" and "noncurriculum
related" are essential to the Act's application. The Act defines
"noninstructional time" as "time set aside by the school before
actual classroom instruction begins or after actual classroom
instruction ends."" 5 This definition apparently prevents access
for religious clubs during, for example, activity periods that occur
within school hours." 6
The Act, however, offers no explicit definition for "noncurri-
culum related" activities and groups.1" If courts adopted a narrow
definition, administrators would be free to deny access to groups
they disfavor by construing their "curriculum" to contemplate all
groups except groups they dislike."8
Opponents of the Equal Access Act were vocal from the be-
ginning,"9 and since 1984, some states have cooperated only
110. S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2348, 2349.
111. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
112. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2364 (1990); see also 130 CONG. REC.
S8355 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Levin) (The Equal Access Act "extends
a similar constitutional rule as enunciated by the Court in Widmar to secondary schools.").
113. 20 U.S.C. S 4071(b).
114. Id. S 4071(a).
115. Id. S 4072(4).
116. Strossen, supra note 6, at 161. The legislative history, however, does not unani-
mously support that reading of the Act. Id. at 161 n.174.
117. Section 4072(3) impliedly refers to noncurriculum related activities as "not directly
related to the school curriculum." 20 U.S.C. S 4072(3). As Professor Strossen notes, "This
language suggests that a school would become subject to the Act's requirements by
granting access to a student group which was indirectly related to the school's curriculum."
Strossen, supra, note 6, at 161 (emphasis added). But see infra notes 122-27 and accom-
panying text.
118. Crewdson, supra note 11, at 183-84. But see infra notes 122-27 and accompanying
text.
119. Wood, Equal Access: A New Direction in American Public Education, 27 J. CHURCH
& ST. 5, 12 (1985). Congressman Gary Ackerman (D-N.Y.) offered this insight: "[The Act]
looks like school prayer, tastes like school prayer, and smells like school prayer." Id.
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nominally with the Act. 120 Congress published a definitional guide
to provide clarification, but some state officials apparently have
ignored the Act and have issued opinions concluding that the
Act violates the establishment clause.12'
Board of Education v. Mergens
In Board of Education v. Mergens,'2 the Supreme Court upheld
the Equal Access Act,12 addressed only the ambiguity surround-
ing "noncurriculum related," and defined that term.24 Phrasing
the opinion, Justice O'Connor stated:
"[N]oncurriculum related student group" is best interpreted
broadly to mean any student group that does not directly
relate to the body of courses offered by the school. In our
view, a student group directly relates to a school's curriculum
if the subject matter of the group is actually taught, or will
soon be taught, in a regularly offered course; if the subject
matter of the group concerns the body of courses as a whole;
if participation in the group is required for a particular course;
or if participation in the group results in academic credit.125
O'Connor argued that this definition avoids the dangers of hinging
the determination of what is "curriculum related" on "abstract
educational goals."' 26 Although the definition creates "a low
threshold for triggering the Act's requirements,"'' the Court
insisted that the definition preserves school officials' traditional
freedoms to determine what students will study in their courses"2
and to maintain the order and discipline necessary to meet
educational objectives.'2
120. Crewdson, supra note 11, at 181-82.
121. Id.
122. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
123. Six Justices in Mergens concluded that the Equal Access Act clearly passed
constitutional muster. Id. at 2373 (O'Connor, J., plurality); id. at 2376 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
124. Id. at 2365-70.
125. Id. at 2366.
126. Id. at 2369. "To define 'curriculum related' in a way that results in almost no
schools having limited open fora, or in a way that permits schools to evade the Act by
strategically describing existing student groups, would render the Act merely hortatory:'
Id.
127. Id. at 2366.
128. Id. at 2367.
129. Id
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Mergens also upheld the Equal Access Act against an estab-
lishment clause challenge. 130 The Justices, however, disagreed as
to why the Act did not violate the establishment clause. 13' O'Con-
nor argued that Widmar v. Vincent 3' applies with equal force to
high school equal access disputes governed by the Act.33 The
speech that the Act protected, like the speech in Widmar, was
only "private speech endorsing religion."' Furthermore, the Act
specifically limits teacher participation,'13 5 and "students will rea-
sonably understand that the school's official recognition of the
club evinces neutrality toward, rather than endorsement of, re-
ligious speech."'3 6
In contrast, Justice Kennedy argued that the Act avoided an
establishment clause violation by providing only incidental ben-
efits to religion and not coercing students to participate in
religious endeavors. 3 7 Justice Marshall, however, argued that
Widmar's applicability and the Act's constitutionality depend on
whether the forum in question, like that in Widmar, includes
many controversial or ideological clubs, which better determines
the access policy's practical effect on students' perceptions. 138
130. Id. at 2373 (O'Connor, J., plurality); id. at 2376 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at
2378 (Marshall, J., concurring).
131. Three opinions refused to strike down the Act as unconstitutional: O'Connor's
approach garnered the support of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Blackmun. Id. at 2370-73 (O'Connor, J., plurality). Justice Scalia joined Justice Kennedy's
concurrence. Id. at 2376-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Marshall also concurred and
Justice Brennan joined his reasoning. Id. at 2378-83 (Marshall, J., concurring).
132. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
133. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2371 (O'Connor, J., plurality) ("We think the logic of Widmar
applies with equal force to the Equal Access Act").
134. I& at 2372 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
135. 20 U.S.C. S 4071(c)(2)-(3) (1988).
136. Mergens, 110 S. Ct at 2372-73 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
137. Id. at 2377 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy urged the two-question standard
as an alternative to the traditional establishment clause focus on whether the government
"endorses" religion:
I should think it inevitable that a public high school "endorses" a religious
club, in a common-sense use of the term, if the club happens to be one of
many activities that the school permits students to choose in order to further
the development of their intellect and character in an extracurricular setting.
But no constitutional violation occurs if the school's action is based upon a
recognition of the fact that membership in a religious club is one of many
permissible ways for a student to further his or her own personal enrichment.
Id. at 2378.
138. Id. at 2379-82 (Marshall, J., concurring). Marshall would further require that the
school take substantive steps to disassociate itself from religious student groups. Id. at
2382-83 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The inclusion of the Christian Club in the type of




The Equal Access Act after Mergens
Even after Mergens, the Equal Access Act is a poor resolution
of the free speech and establishment clause tension implicit in
equal access disputes because it essentially vetoes the anti-
establishment interest. By forcing the Widmar analysis'8 9 on the
high school context, Congress ignores the establishment clause
concerns which may arise in particular circumstances. 40 Surely
context ought to have some effect, and five Justices in Mergens
agreed that the Act, constitutional or not, fails to accommodate
the important factual differences with Widmar that may occur
in high school access disputes.'4'
In addition, definitional ambiguities continue to exist. One
commentator argued, for example, that the Act's definitional
ambiguities could feasibly result in the Act's application to junior
high and elementary schools, where the anti-establishment inter-
est is greatest. 42 Furthermore, the Act's definitional uncertainty
causes unusually broad consequences to follow from normal ad-
ministrative decisions. 4 3 These definitional problems have chilled
activity periods because some school districts ended all- noncur-
riculum-type activities in order to avoid the community discord
that religious groups would likely cause. 44 The Court's definition
of "noncurriculum related"' 45 does little to remove this problem. 46
139. See supra notes 85-107 and accompanying text.
140. See generally Note, The Equal Access Act: Is It A Solution or Part of the Problem?,
8 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 353 (1986) (Act is unconstitutional).
141. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2376 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (The student clubs recognized
at Westside school are "a far cry" from the groups officially recognized in Widma, "one
of the consequences of the statute, as we now interpret it, is that clubs of a most
controversial character might have access to the student life of high schools that in the
past have given official recognition only to clubs of a more conventional kind"); id. at
2380 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[Tihe plurality fails to recognize that the wide-open and
independent character of the student forum in Widmar differs substantially from the
forum at Westside"); id. at 2383-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (The Act adopts Widmar and
the Court should compare to Widmar's facts in interpreting what the law requires in
particular circumstances).
142. Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech
by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 51 (1986).
143. For example, "[b]y drawing a dichotomy between the narrowly conceived category
of 'noncurriculum related' clubs and all other clubs, the Act gives schools virtually an
all-or-nothing choice concerning the subject matter limitations upon student clubs that
will be permitted to meet in any limited open forum:' Strossen, supra note 6, at 163-64.
144. Crewdson, supra note 11, at 183.
145. [A] student group directly relates to a school's curriculum if the
subject matter of the group is actually taught, or will soon be taught, in a
regularly offered course; if the subject matter of the group concerns the
1990] 143
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In addition, Mergens' "noncurriculum related" definition may
create as many problems as it solves. For instance, although the
definition prevents administrators from using "abstract educa-
tional goals" to discriminate against certain groups,'147 those of-
ficials who do discriminate may exercise their authority to
determine course content to accomplish the same result.148 For
example,
[i]t would appear that the school could alter the "noncurriculum
related" status of [the scuba diving club] simply by, for ex-
ample, including one day of scuba instruction in its swimming
classes, or by requiring physical education teachers to urge
student participation in the club, or even by soliciting regular
comments from the club about how the school could better
accommodate the club's interest within coursework. 149
Thus, the Court's definition permits-indeed, even forces-those
school officials who would discriminate through "definitional fiat"'1
to do so in a way that is less vulnerable to constitutional review.15'
Finally, the Equal Access Act, as currently written, invites cer-
tain types of speech, such as that of hate groups, that even many
free speech advocates do not support.'5 2
body of courses as a whole; if participation in the group is required for a
particular course; or if participation in the group results in academic credit.
Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2366.
146. Id. at 2383-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens pointed out:
Under the Court's interpretation of the Act, Congress has imposed a difficult
choice on public high schools receiving federal financial assistance. If such a
school continues to allow students to participate in such familiar and innoc-
uous activities as a school chess or scuba diving club, it must also allow
religious groups to make use of school facilities. Indeed, it is hard to see
how a cheerleading squad or a pep club, among the most common student
groups in American high schools, could avoid being "noncurriculum related"
under the majority's test.
Id. at 2391 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 2391 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 2386 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. The Court stated clearly that it will respect school officials' decisions regarding
what students will learn and how they will learn it. Id. at 2367.
152. If the "limited open forum" exists, then anyone may gain access. Id. at 2373
(O'Connor, J., plurality) ("Under the Act, a school with a limited open forum may not
lawfully deny access to a Jewish students' club, a Young Democrats club, or a philosophy
club devoted to the study of Nietzsche."); id. at 2393 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (if a public
school permits noncontroversial "traditional extracurricular activities," it cannot then
exclude controversial groups such as the Ku Klux Klan); see also Note, The Equal Access
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Considering these inadequacies, Congress should modify the
Equal Access Act. Currently, the Act, coupled with Mergens'
multiple opinions, only confuses the balancing process that ought
to occur in equal access cases. By emphasizing unconditionally
the free speech interest, the Act prevents thoughtful considera-
tion of legitimate establishment clause concerns. Importantly,
legislative action or further judicial interpretation may modify
the Act in the future as facts warrant. 10
Approaches To Balancing The Competing Constitutional Interests
The United States Courts of Appeals
Five courts of appeals have dealt with the equal access claims
of student-initiated groups in public high schools outside of the
Equal Access Act context1es None of these courts found that the
free speech interest outweighed the establishment clause concern,
but they provide examples of different approaches to resolving
equal access cases. The two earliest cases, Brandon v. Board of
Education5 5 and Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Inde-
pendent School District,56 did not attempt to balance the compet-
ing constitutional values. Both cases involved disputes over the
constitutional appropriateness of student religious groups meet-
ing in school facilities before or after regular school hours. 57 The
Second and Fifth Circuits decided that the danger of a "symbolic
inference"'- of government approval of a particular religious
Act: A Haven for High School "Hate Groups"?, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 589, 613 (1985) (The
Equal Access Act "has created, or greatly enhanced, the likelihood of a Nazi, KKK, or
other 'hate group' meeting in a public secondary school.").
The Act inspires further criticisms. For example, the Act includes no explicit enforce-
ment provision. Furthermore, potential federalism barriers in a court action exist and
may render the Act unenforceable in some contexts. See Note, Using Federal Funds to
Dictate Local Policies: Student Religious Meetings Under the Equal Access Act, 3 YALE L.
& PoL'Y REV. 187 (1984).
153. The Act contains a safety clause providing that if any part of the Act is ruled
unconstitutional, the remaining provisions will not be affected. 20 U.S.C. 5 4073 (1988).
Any modification may therefore be achieved via judicial or legislative routes.
154. Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989); Bell v. Little
Axe Indep. School Dist. No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985); Bender v. Williamsport
Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534
(1986); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th
Cir. 1982); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
155. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
156. 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982).
157. Brandon, 635 F.2d at 973; Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1039.
158. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained: "To an impressionable
1990]
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view constituted an advancement of religion in violation of the
Lemon test.159 Significantly, neither court recognized any student
free speech interest because, in the courts' view, "a high school
is not a 'public forum' where religious views can be freely
aired."'160 At least one commentator observed that the Brandon
and Lubbock decisions suggested "a categorical rule precluding
concerted student religious expression in public schools." 61
In 1984, the Third Circuit endeavored a serious balancing of
free speech and anti-establishment interests in Bender v. Wil-
liamsport Area School District.62 In Bender, the school denied
permission to a student-initiated prayer club to meet during the
high school's regularly scheduled activity period.163 To qualify for
access to the activity period, the school required the club to aid
students' growth socially, physically, or intellectually. 64 The stu-
dent prayer club was the first group ever denied admittance to
the activity period.' 65
The court of appeals first addressed the students' free speech
right.166 Following the Widmar analysis, the court determined
student, even the mere appearance of secular involvement in religious activities might
indicate that the state has placed its imprimatur on a particular religious creed. This
symbolic inference is too dangerous to permit." Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978; Lubbock, 669
F.2d at 1045 (quoting Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978). The opinion in Brandon hinges that
conclusion on some rather bold speculation:
An adolescent may perceive "voluntary" school prayer in a different light if
he were to see the captain of the school's football team, the student body
president, or the leading actress in a dramatic production participating in
communal prayer meetings in the "captive audience" setting of a school.
Misconceptions over the appropriate roles of church and state learned during
one's school years may never be corrected. As Alexander Pope noted, "Tis
Education forms the common mind,/Just as the twig is bent, the tree's
inclin'd."
635 F.2d at 978 (citation omitted).
159. Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978-79; Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1047.
160. Brandon, 635 F.2d at 980; Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1048 (quoting Brandon, 635 F.2d
at 980). Notably, the Second Circuit decided Brandon before Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1981), and thus did not incorporate Widmar's application of the limited public forum
to an educational setting. In Lubbock, however, the Fifth Circuit faced a claim by the
school district that the district created a limited public forum when it allowed student
groups to meet before or after school hours. 669 F.2d at 1048. The Lubbock opinion
sidestepped the issue by stating that "Itihis public forum argument was, in fact, explicitly
rejected in Brandon." Id. Brandon, of course, predated Widmar. As a post-Brandon
Supreme Court holding, the Fifth Circuit should have discussed Widmar and its impli-
cations.
161. Strossen, supra note 6, at 135.
162. 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
163. Id. at 541.
164. Id. at 544 (citing the Affidavit of Wayne Newton, the school principal).
165. Id. at 543, 548.
166. Id. at 545-50.
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that the activity period was a limited public forum.167 Writing
for the court, Judge Garth recognized that high schools were
less likely than universities to create limited public forums be-
cause of the high schools' more circumscribed educational mis-
sion.168 Nevertheless, a high school may create a limited public
forum.
169
Garth observed that the high school created a limited public
forum by articulating access requirements for its activity pe-
riod. 70 Because the student prayer club met the requirements of
promoting the intellectual and social growth of students, the
students' right to participate vested.' 7 1 Once a school creates a
limited public forum, exclusion of qualifying clubs must serve a
compelling state interest and the school must narrowly draw its
exclusion policy.'72
Turning to the establishment clause issue, the court held that
although the limited public forum had a valid secular purpose,
the primary effect of including the religious group was the
advancement of religion.1'73 In reaching this conclusion, Garth
focused on the high school students' relative immaturity when
compared to the university students affected in Widmar.174 He
argued that high school students "would be less able to appreciate
the fact that permission for [the prayer club] to meet would be
granted out of a spirit of neutrality toward religion and not
advancement.."' 75 The court cited compulsory attendance and the
structured environment of high school as additional contributors
to the "danger of communicating. . . state approval of religion."' 176
Finally, the court reasoned that the required supervision of a
teacher caused an excessive entanglement between the state and
religion.17 7
167. Id. at 547-49.
168. Id. at 548-49.
169. Id. at 548.
170. Id. at 548-49.
171. Id. at 549-50.
172. Id. at 550. The court later assessed the stature of the establishment clause to be
a potentially "compelling state interest." Id. at 550-58. Importantly, however, the court
never returned to the free speech analysis to ask whether the school used the least
restrictive means. The absence of this important aspect of the public forum analysis
prevented the court from giving adequate weight to the free speech interest when the
court subsequently estimated the constitutional net benefit.
173. Id. at 551-55.
174. Id. at 552-53.
175. Id. at 552.
176. Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 555-57.
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After concluding that an establishment clause violation oc-
curred and that a free speech right existed, the Third Circuit
weighed the interests.178 Garth began by stating that Widmar's
classification of anti-establishment goals as a compelling state
interest did not automatically require that the establishment
clause "override free speech rights.' 1 79 He argued that both
doctrines may need to bend in reasonably approaching the con-
stitutional dilemma.180 The court suggested a fact-specific balanc-
ing test to apply that principle:
[T]he appropriate analysis requires weighing the competing
interests protected by each constitutional provision, given the
specific facts of the case, in order to determine under what
circumstances the net benefit which accrues to one of these
interests outweighs the net harm done to the other. Recogniz-
ing that, under these circumstances, some constitutional pro-
tections must unavoidably be abridged, we believe that our
role is to maximize, as best as possible, the overall measure
of the fundamental rights created by the Framers, by deciding
which course of action will lead to the lesser deprivation of
those rights. 181
Garth's application of his net-benefit test arguably undershot
the test's potential. In fact, the two arguments supporting the
court's ultimate finding did very little "weighing" if any. Garth
concluded that the application of the test to the Bender facts
tipped the balance in favor of the school's anti-establishment
policy. 82 The court grounded this conclusion on two observations.
First, the opinion recounted that the students' speech right was
not absolute; the right depended on the existence of the limited
public forum, and school authorities could abolish or further limit
that forum.as Emphasizing that fact, however, begged the ques-
178. Id. at 557-60.
179. Id. at 558; see supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
180. Thus, while it is true that the Establishment Clause might provide
a compelling state interest to restrain speech, it does not do so in every
case. The parameters of the Establishment Clause may bend somewhat in
order to accommodate another fundamental interest-free speech, just as
the speech clause must, depending on the circumstances, accommodate the
objectives of the Establishment Clause.
Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 559 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on
other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 559-60.
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tion in favor of the establishment clause. If the school could limit
the forum on the basis of speech content without constitutional
review, the court did not need to reach the establishment clause
issue: the school district could freely limit the students' speech
right. Read literally, the court's observation allows any admin-
istrator to single out particular religious speech for exclusion
from a new, more limited forum. Such a consequence does not
constitute "balancing" in search of a constitutionally minded net
benefit; rather, it suggests a method by which a public school
administrator may limit free speech without constitutional re-
view. Widmar sought to end this very evil.1'
Second, the court asserted that "public schools have never
been a forum for religious expression."'85 In other words, "[tihe
free speech right enjoyed by the students is therefore of a
dramatically different character than the right to communicate
in a traditional public forum such as a park."'86
The court's attempt to distinguish the high school activity
period from a traditional public forum is confusing. The students
claimed that the activity period was a limited public forum;
indeed, the court had already so held. 8 7 This contrast with a
traditional public forum seems irrelevant and offers no "balanc-
ing" or "weighing" of constitutional concerns in search of a net
benefit. Thus, although the Third Circuit created a "novel, open-
ended balancing test," 88 it failed to apply the test in an under-
standable manner.
In Bell v. Little Axe Independent School District No. 70,189
decided a year after Bender, the Tenth Circuit faced an equal
access situation involving a public elementary school. 90 A parent
group sued the school district after an elementary school failed
to cancel voluntary student religious meetings despite parents'
anti-establishment concerns.' 91 The court applied Bender's "net
benefit" test 92 and concluded that, considering the age and im-
184. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981).
185. Bender, 741 F.2d at 560.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 550.
188. Strossen, A Framework for Evaluating Equal Access Claims by Student Religious
Groups: Is There a Window for Free Speech in the Wall Separating Church and State?, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 143, 156 (1985).
189. 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985).
190. Id. at 1396-98.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1400-07; see supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text for an explanation
of the "net-benefit" test.
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pressionability of elementary school children, the establishment
clause interest was especially compelling and thus outweighed
the rights that flow from the creation of a limited public forum.193
Finally, in Garnett v. Renton School District No. 403,194 the
defendant school district initiated a "co-curricular" activity pe-
riod.195 The district's access criteria required that the clubs'
purposes "be an extension of a specific program or course offer-
ing.' 196 The Ninth Circuit, citing heavily from Brandon v. Board
of Education,197 reasoned that granting access to the religious
student group would result in an establishment clause violation.198
The violation would be unavoidable, the court stated, given the
impressionability of students and the district's faculty supervision
requirement. 99 Further, the court argued that the district's policy
did not violate free speech rights because the policy did not
create a limited public forum.200
The Mergens Opinions
Because Board of Education v. Mergens201 addressed only the
constitutionality of the Equal Access Act,2 2 the Court established
no precedent governing the resolution of equal access disputes
that do not arise from a noncurricular activity period as defined
by the Act. Two of the opinions, however, suggest possible
resolutions for the broader range of high school equal access
cases. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion 20 3 and Justice Kenne-
dy's concurrence 20 4 suggest that future establishment clause chal-
193. Id. at 1404, 1407. The court did conclude that the previous access of religious
groups along with other groups created a limited public forum. Id. at 1402.
194. 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989).
195. Id. at 609.
196. Id.
197. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
198. Garnett, 874 F.2d at 610-12.
199. Id. at 612.
200. Id. at 612-13. Because the activity period was open only to co-curricular clubs
compatible with the school's educational mission, the court held that the Equal Access
Act was inapplicable. Id. The Act requires access of student groups into activity periods
only if the school allows other "noncurriculum related student groups" to participate. 20
U.S.C. S 4071(b) (1988).
201. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
202. Id. at 2370 ("[W]e need not decide-and therefore express no opinion on-whether
the First Amendment requires the same result."); id. at 2373 (O'Connor, J., plurality)
("Because we hold that petitioners have violated the Act, we do not decide respondents'
claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.").
203. Id. at 2370-73 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
204. Id. at 2376-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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lenges to equal aczess policies may fail more often than not as a
matter of establishment clause doctrine.
If the Court refuses to find that an establishment clause
violation exists, then no need will exist to balance the anti-
establishment interest against free speech claims. For example,
O'Connor's rejection of traditional legal notions about high school
students' impressionability 2°5 vitiates the establishment clause
analysis offered in the appellate decisions20 6 addressing other
equal access scenarios. Indeed, Kennedy rejected the "endorse-
ment test" altogether and would recognize an establishment
clause violation only if the equal access policy provided more
than incidental benefits to religion and actually coerced students
to participate in religious activities. 20 7 Although neither opinion
instructs courts on how to balance the free speech and establish-
ment clause interests if both manifest, they suggest that the
Court will rarely recognize an establishment clause violation and,
as a result, will avoid reaching the balancing issue in many
cases.20s
THE IMPRESSIONABILITY RATIONALE
Neither Mergens nor the equal access decisions of the courts
of appeals 209 presented a unified approach to equal access dis-
putes. The decisions were, however, similar in that most of the
circuit opinions 210 applied what this Note entitles the "impression-
205. Id. at 2371-73 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
206. See Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 874 F.2d 608, 611 (9th Cir. 1989);
Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 551-55 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on
other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep.
School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir. 1982); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971,
978 (2d Cir. 1980).
207. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2377-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
208. The two opinions comprise the views of six Justices: Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Blackmun joined Justice O'Connor. Id. at 2370-73 (O'Connor, J.,
plurality). Justice Scalia joined Justice Kennedy's concurrence. Id. at 2376-78 (Kennedy,
J., concurring). Significantly, these Justices upheld a statute that favors unconditionally
the free speech interest over the risk of an establishment clause violation. See supra
notes 13941 and accompanying text.
209. The circuits evidenced two basic approaches. The first approach, seen in Lubbock,
669 F.2d 1038, and Brandon, 635 F.2d 971, suggested a "categorical rule precluding
concerted student religious expression in public schools." Strossen, supra note 6, at 135.
The second approach, seen in Bell v. Little Axe Independent School District No. 70, 766
F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985), and Bender, 741 F.2d 538, employed "ad hoc analyses ....
[flocusing upon the particular facts presented." Strossen, supra note 6, at 135.
210. Garnett, 874 F.2d at 611; Bender, 741 F.2d at 551-55; Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1045;
Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978.
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ability rationale," and three opinions in Mergens integrated this
rationale into their analysis.21 '
Both Widmar v. Vincent212 and Bender v. Williamsport Area
School District213 applied the impressionability rationale, which
contends that the relative impressionability of students in high
schools distinguishes high schools from universities for equal
access purposes. Professor Levin provides a concise description:
The "special characteristics" of the elementary and secondary
school environment include the fact that students, being com-
pelled to attend school, are a captive audience, that the stu-
dents are not yet fully developed intellectually or emotionally,
that the educational enterprise has an obligation to protect the
safety of all students and to provide them with an atmosphere
conducive to education, and that the purpose of compulsory
education is to inculcate the social, moral and political values
of the community (however defined) and, in particular, to pre-
pare the young to participate as citizens in our democratic
society.214
In equal access cases, the impressionability rationale is incon-
sistent with case law concerning student rights21-5 and is factually
unsupported.216 Furthermore, the rationale analytically hinders
the process of balancing the competing anti-establishment and
free speech values because it blends and thus muddles those
values . 217
Inconsistencies with Non-equal Access Student Rights
The glaring inconsistencies between impressionability assump-
tions regarding high school students affected by equal access
cases and that which some courts assume about high school
students involved in other controversies are obvious wherever
the contrast is made. For example, if courts consider students
mature enough to access contraceptives, 218 to read articles in the
211. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2371-73 (O'Connor, J., plurality); id. at 2380-82 (Marshall, J.,
concurring); id. at 2385 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
212. 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981).
213. 741 F.2d at 551-55.
214. Levin, supra note 28, at 1678 (citation omitted).
215. See infra notes 218-27 and accompanying text.
216. See infra notes 228-37 and accompanying text.
217. See infra notes 23847 and accompanying text.
218. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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school newspaper that map out sexual behavioral trends within
the student body,219 and to hold controversial political meetings
on campus,20 then courts cannot contend logically that students
are too impressionable to understand that the allowance of certain
groups within a forum does not mean the endorsement of the
beliefs of those groups.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
determined that a school barring students from distributing a
newspaper with articles questioning the validity of drug laws
compromised students' free speech rights;2' yet, the same court
later found the students' relative impressionability too tender to
risk exposure to a student religious group meeting on school
premises after class hours.2 Judge Kaufman of the Second Cir-
cuit reasoned that students would not perceive a teacher's wear-
ing of a black armband to protest Vietnam as the position of the
school or state.m When he wrote the opinion in Brandon v. Board
of Education,2 however, Kaufman refused to risk the "symbolic
inference" he imagined would arise if a 'religious club met during
noninstructional time.25 Indeed, some high school students may
seek an abortion without parental consent 226 but may be unable
to see through the mist of equal access policies and avoid the
impression of state imprimatur.2
Factually Unsupported and Inherently Illogical
Additionally, the impressionability thesis is factually unsup-
ported. After the Supreme Court declared in Widmar v. Vin-
219. Gambino v. Fairfax City School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va.), affid per curiam,
564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977).
220. Dixon v. Beresh, 361 F. Supp. 253 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
221. Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970-72 (5th Cir. 1972).
222. Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1045
(5th Cir. 1982); see supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
223. James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 574 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042
(1972).
224. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
225. Id. at 978. In Kaufman's words, this unproven risk was "too dangerous to permit."
Id.
226. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
227. Board of Education v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990), evidenced this inconsistency
as well. In Mergens, the school denied access for fear of an establishment misinterpretation
by sensitive students. Id. at 2362-63. Yet, the same school administrators deemed students
discerning enough to permit a teacher to show The Omen in class pursuant to a class
discussion regarding Satanism. MacNeillLehrer News Hour: Scripture in School (PBS
television broadcast, Jan. 9, 1990) (interview with Douglas Veith, counsel for Bridget
Mergens).
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cent 228 that university students "are less impressionable than
younger students,"2 9 the courts of appeals boldly interpreted
that statement to establish high school students' prohibitive
impressionability. The courts offered no other evidence and dis-
regarded the fact that the Widmar statement, expressed in a
footnote, did not address high schools specifically.20
Most scientific evidence suggests that exposure to a breadth
of ideas poses little danger to high school students.P1 One expert
suggested that traditional assumptions about the differences be-
tween students at high school and college ages are less reliable
today. 23 In truth, the presumptions implicit in the impressiona-
bility rationale-that high school students are easily persuaded
and college students are more discerning-run counter to both
past studies and current developmental theories.2
228. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
229. Id. at 274 n.14.
230. Strossen, supra note 6, at 146.
231. Note, The Constitutional Dimensions ofStudent-Initiated Religious Activity in Public
High Schools, 92 YALE L.J. 499, 508-09 (1983).
232. S. PARKS, THE CRITICAL YEARS: THE YOUNG ADULT SEARCH FOR A FAITH To LIVE
By 2 (1986).
233. Studies that William Perry conducted at Harvard's Bureau of Study Counsel, W.
PERRY, FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL AND ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE COLLEGE YEARS 57-
176 (1970), set out nine stages of cognitive development, which Professor Parks of
Harvard's Divinity School applied to the issue of how young adults grow intellectually
and spiritually. S. PARKS, supra note 232, at 44-53.
Prior to and at the time when students enter college, their form of cognition is
authority-bound and dualistic. Id. at 44-47. Because these students ground their ultimate
convictions in some authority, sometimes their religious heritage, they do not exercise
true intellectual independence, although they are often very "opinionated." Id. Their
concept of truth, tied into a particular symbol of authority, changes only when the
authority is released. Id. The college experience, Parks explains, is usually the impetus
for that release. Id. at 47-49.
Yet, the young adults who recognize the obvious limits of their authority-based beliefs
do not suddenly gain "a critically aware sense of responsibility for self and world." Id.
at 2. Rather, these university students experience an unqualified relativism as they
realize that "all knowledge is conditioned by the particularity of the relation or context
in which it is composed." Id. at 47.
In other words, the high school student is not likely to be "impressionable" in matters
of faith and ultimate truth because they are tied to a "felt relationship to an ethos of
assumed Authority." Id. at 55. Professor Parks emphasizes that this level of cognitive
development may characterize some persons "throughout the whole of biological adult-
hood - . . . [D]evelopment of cognition beyond this Authority-bound form of knowing does
not inevitably occur." Id. at 46. University students, in contrast, have not fully matured
intellectually either, but the form of cognition for many college students is unqualified
relativism. Id. at 47.
These observations illustrate the misguided simplicity of the courts' assumptions
regarding cognitive development of high school students. Furthermore, Professor Parks'
analysis suggests that one cannot generalize regarding human intellectual and religious
development on the basis of age or school grade.
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Even assuming that high school students are more impression-
able than university students, high school students will not nec-
essarily misunderstand a school's neutral position on equal
access.2 Indeed, "[tlhe proposition that schools do not endorse
everything they fail to censor is not complicated." 235 Furthermore,
if students are such bold speculators that they will conclude that
an open forum constituted the school's endorsement of religion,
then students may make the opposite inference, that the school
seeks to inhibit religion, if the school restricts access. 6 Finally,
if students are such sensitive recipients of information that they
draw broad conclusions from an open forum, then they will surely
understand a clear disclaimer by the school, written in plain
English237
Muddling Constitutional Values and Standards
Regardless of the use of a disclaimer, however, the continued
application of the impressionability thesis is highly undesirable
from a doctrinal standpoint: the rationale muddles equal access
deliberation because it mixes the anti-establishment and social
inculcation interests of the school without adjusting the eviden-
tiary burdens.
The establishment clause interest flows from the first amend-
ment and justifies a school's avoidance of policies appearing to
advance one religious view over another.m In establishment
clause cases, evidence of a danger that students will perceive a
state imprimatur justifies finding an establishment clause viola-
tion.29 For example, in Brandon v. Board of Education,40 the
Second Circuit claimed an establishment clause violation because
234. Strossen, supra note 188, at 162-63.
235. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2372 (O'Connor, J., plurality). But see id. at 2382 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
236. Id. at 2371 ("[]f a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to others,
then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion"); see also Strossen,
supra note 6, at 146 ("If students are inherently bound to perceive a school's equal
treatment of student religious groups as conveying its approval of religion, it would
logically follow that students would also be likely to perceive the school's unequal
treatment of student religious groups as conveying its disapproval of religion.").
237. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2372-73 (O'Connor, J., plurality). Often a disclaimer or
explanatory statement will be the least restrictive means available in pursuing the state's
compelling anti-establishment interest.
238. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see supra notes 18-24 and accompanying
text.
239. Strossen, supra note 6, at 124-25, 125 n.33.
240. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
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"[t]o an impressionable student, even the mere appearance of
secular involvement in religious activities might indicate that the
state has placed its imprimatur on a particular religious creed.
This symbolic inference is too dangerous to permit. ' 241 A founda-
tion as nebulous as a fear of "symbolic inferences," therefore,
may justify establishment clause violations. 242
By contrast, the school's inculcation interest flows from the
line of cases defining students' free speech rights.243 The high
school has an interest in inculcating social values, such as teaching
good behavior and good citizenship.24 4 This role justifies the
restriction of student speech when the school proves that the
speech in question will effect a concrete injury to the school's
inculcative role. As the Supreme Court recognized in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District,245 an "undif-
ferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression. 24 6 Rather, school
officials must show that "engaging in the forbidden conduct would
'materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.' " '
Considering the inculcation and anti-establishment interests
together, as they are in the impressionability rationale, their
evidentiary standards collide. If a school administrator restricts
a student's free speech right, he or she may not base that action
on a hunch or fear of certain consequences; the official must
establish a "material and substantial" harm.2 8 Through the im-
pressionability thesis, however, that same administrator may use
an anti-establishment purpose to circumvent students' free speech
rights by discriminating on the basis of content without specifi-
cally finding a material harm. As an evidentiary factor in equal
241. Id. at 978 (emphasis added).
242. Significantly, courts in equal access cases use the inculcative function of schools,
including mandatory attendance, to prove the existence of "symbolic inferences." The
inculcative function, however, is a policy interest related to the school's educational
mission, not a description of student development or sensitivities. See infra notes 243-44
and accompanying text.
243. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel School Dist. v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969). As previously noted, although Bethel and Hazelwood weaken Tinker in
the purely free speech arena, they do not overrule Tinker and are distinguishable in the
equal access context. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
245. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
246. Id. at 508 (emphasis added).




access cases, the impressionability rationale subtly preempts the
student free speech case law and frustrates any serious attempt
to balance the competing constitutional values. 249
In conclusion, courts should cease to rely on the impressiona-
bility thesis and should acknowledge that the distinction between
high school students and college students is not as dramatic as
formerly construed. Discarding the impressionability rationale,
however, does not solve the problem of properly balancing the
anti-establishment and free speech interests when determining
whether an establishment clause violation constitutes a compel-
ling state interest. Courts should not use rejection of the im-
pressionability rationale as an excuse to ignore establishment
clause concerns.2 ° Yet, when both establishment clause and free
speech interests are manifest, courts must somehow balance
them. This Note suggests an evidentiary test to fill the analytical
void.
BLENDING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND FREE SPEECH
STANDARDS: A PROPOSED TEST
The proposed test focuses on the evidentiary burdens that
distinguish establishment clause doctrine from that governing
the restriction of student speech rights. The test seeks to raise
the establishment clause evidentiary standard in equal access
cases in order to more realistically determine whether a compel-
ling state interest exists. When a court deciding an equal access
dispute finds both a limited public forum and an establishment
clause violation, it should reapproach the establishment clause
issue using the following test.
First, the court should ask whether a substantial likelihood
exists that students will interpret the access grant to communi-
cate government endorsement of a particular religious view. This
element of the test focuses on the student body as a broad group,
as does the analysis in most findings of establishment clause
249. Professor Strossen suggests that establishment clause interests should not apply
to equal access policy decisions because the school, in making such policy decisions, would
be acting in its noninculcative role. Strossen, supra note 6, at 147. High schools serve a
"dual role: not only to inculcate the majoritarian views and values deemed necessary for
meaningful citizenship, but also to provide a 'marketplace of ideas,' stimulating free
individual inquiry." Id. (citing Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (plurality opinion)). Under Professor Strossen's argument,
even the misuse of the inculcation interest would not be persuasive.
250. See supra notes 13941, 203, 205-06, 208 and accompanying text.
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violation,251 but this element raises the traditional establishment
clause evidentiary standard to require a substantial likelihood
that students will read the access to mean a government impri-
matur. Courts should interpret substantial likelihood to require
more than a mere fear of a potential pro-establishment reading
by students, but less than a preponderance of the evidence.
Second, if the school permitted access by student religious
groups, the court should ask whether specific evidence of actual
harm to students exists. This part of the test satisfies Tinker's
concern that a school show a "material and substantial" injury
before restricting student speech.2 2 Furthermore, because this
prong requires proof that at least one person took offense or
misread the school's neutrality, it further ensures that the school
actually met the substantial likelihood standard.
This test requires affirmative answers to both questions, as-
suming the second question is applicable, if the establishment
clause is to outweigh free speech interests. If the anti-establish-
ment concern meets the first two prongs of this test and is thus
a compelling interest, the court should ask the final question: Is
the policy that denies access the least restrictive means available?
This third prong ensures completion of the two-stepped strict
scrutiny applicable under the limited public forum doctrine.2,
Courts should concentrate primarily on the schoolwide impact
of the equal access in dispute. In other words, specific instances
of student misperception ought to validate, if possible, the finding
that a substantial likelihood of a schoolwide student perception
of state religious partisanship exists. Specific instances do not
prove, however, the existence of a substantial likelihood of a
schoolwide pro-establishment reading.2-
251. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (struck down statute requiring
the teaching of creationism); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (struck down moment
of silence); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (struck down the posting of
the Ten Commandments on classroom wall); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(struck down classroom Bible readings); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (struck down
reading of state-composed prayer); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (struck
down release time for voluntary religious instruction).
252. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966)).
253. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
254. This qualification precludes the possibility of a "heckler's veto." Although the
heckler's veto is possible under the Equal Access Act, Crewdson, supra note 11, at 181,
courts should avoid such a veto in equal access cases that the Act does not cover and to
which this test potentially applies.
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The proposed test's three principal advantages link directly to
the doctrinal weaknesses that this Note criticizes.2 55 First, the
test facilitates a more realistic balancing of the competing con-
stitutional values by replacing a presumed condition-the im-
pressionability rationale-with a concrete evidentiary standard.2"
Second, the test moves the equal access case law towards in-
creased consistency with other student rights decisions by pre-
suming the intelligence of students instead of relative
immaturity.2 57 As a matter of analytic coherence, this second
advantage ensures the importance of addressing the limited pub-
lic forum doctrine's least restrictive means requirement.2 8 A
presumption that students enjoy reasonable cognitive abilities
recognizes the possibility of a reasonable disclaimer or explana-
tory statement by the school.259 Finally, this evidentiary standard
will encourage high schools to expand the right of religious
students to free expression on religious topics, although such
expression will not be as protected as secular speech in the equal
access context.
CONCLUSION
Equal access disputes present free speech and the establish-
ment clause, two compelling first amendment interests, in direct
tension. Because both interests represent fundamental constitu-
tional values grounded in our national conscience, the equal access
necessity of favoring one over the other should prompt unusual
care by the courts.
Regrettably, the Equal Access Act precludes detailed weighing,
rather than encouraging it. The Equal Access Act, however, does
not govern most high school access scenarios. Unfortunately, the
255. The test's value and applicability depend on a court's agreement with the analysis
set out above. Specifically, a court must agree with three conclusions underlying the test.
First, Tinker's substantial injury and material interference standard applies to equal
access cases more appropriately than the standards flowing from Bethel and Hazelwood.
See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text. Second, as a matter of public forum law,
courts should apply Widmar's limited public forum to high school equal access cases and,
thus, strictly scrutinize content-based access denials. See supra notes 67-84 and accom-
panying text. Third, the impressionability rationale is an unrealistic and illogical judicial
assumption in the 1990's, and the courts should not rely on it. See supra notes 209-250
and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 209-50 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 218-27 and accompanying text.
258. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).
259. See Strossen, upra note 6, at 144.
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Court did not address the larger issue or offer a clear precedent
in Mergens.
In many equal access cases, confusion over the current state
of public forum law invites unrestrained censorship by school
administrators. The Supreme Court should preserve the limited
public forum because it provides a useful method of approaching
the free speech interest in equal access disputes. The limited
public forum will require a school official who restricts students
from meeting on campus facilities to rely on a compelling state
interest pursued through the least restrictive means available.
America's students, who learn of their free speech heritage
during high school, deserve no less.
Finally, the courts should abandon their use of the highly
manipulable and illogical impressionability rationale which invites
judges to shortcut the essential constitutional balancing in equal
access cases. Instead, the courts should adopt this Note's pro-
posed test.
A court should apply the proposed test in equal access cases
if it concludes that an establishment clause violation exists and
that the students' free speech rights have vested. The test
reapproaches the establishment clause evaluation with a height-
ened standard that affirms a schoolwide focus while ensuring
that the predicted imprimatur is grounded in the real-world
experience of at least some students. If the test is met, the
establishment concern will outweigh the free speech interest,
assuming that the school's policy constitutes the least restrictive
means to avoid the appearance of religious partisanship.
This test represents a doctrinally sensitive compromise be-
tween free speech and the establishment clause in the public
high school equal access situation. Its adoption will move current
jurisprudence towards a more precise and candid engagement of
this "constitutional conflict of the highest order.."260
D. Jarrett Arp
260. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 557 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated
on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
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